主 题：“Bundled Procurement for Technology Acquisition and Future Competition”
主讲人：王云增 教授 美国加州大学河滨分校商学院院长
主持人：洪江涛 副教授 上海对外经贸大学国际经贸学院
时 间：2016年12月19日（星期一）13:30—15:00
地 点：上海对外经贸大学博识楼113会议室
主讲人简介：
王云增教授是加州大学河滨分校安德森商学院院长, 终身教授。 1986年毕业于哈尔滨工业大学后进入加拿大滑铁卢大学获得管理科学硕士。1998年获得沃顿商学院（宾夕法尼亚大学）运营管理专业博士学位。先后在德克萨斯大学达拉斯分校，加州大学河滨分校任副教授，教授，并历任副院长和院长。他的研究主要关注合同理论，博弈理论，供应链管理和动态规划，中美经济及教育发展与合作等。曾在管理科学领域顶级或一流期刊如Operations Research，Management Science和M&SOM等发表多篇论文, 并担任POMS, IIE Transactions，Decision Sciences等国际一流期刊的副主编或高级编辑，是管理科学领域内国际知名专家。
Abstract:
Consider a buyer who would like to procure certain products for current consumption and the underlying technologies so that he can become a supplier and compete with current suppliers in the future market. One potential procurement mechanism for such a buyer is to bundle the procurement project with technology acquisition. We propose a dynamic stochastic game-theoretic model that analyzes the optimal technology offer strategies of the asymmetric suppliers and highlights how the size of the current project, relative to the size of the future market, and supplier competition determine the effectiveness of the bundled procurementmechanism for the buyer. We find that a project size of 5% to 10% of the future market is sufficient for the suppliers to offer their best technologies. Under such conditions, the premium for the buyer to pay for technology acquisition is relatively small, compared to the pro?t the buyer achieves by becoming a future technology supplier and competing with existing suppliers in the future market.
主讲人：王云增 教授 美国加州大学河滨分校商学院院长
主持人：洪江涛 副教授 上海对外经贸大学国际经贸学院
时 间：2016年12月19日（星期一）13:30—15:00
地 点：上海对外经贸大学博识楼113会议室
主讲人简介：
王云增教授是加州大学河滨分校安德森商学院院长, 终身教授。 1986年毕业于哈尔滨工业大学后进入加拿大滑铁卢大学获得管理科学硕士。1998年获得沃顿商学院（宾夕法尼亚大学）运营管理专业博士学位。先后在德克萨斯大学达拉斯分校，加州大学河滨分校任副教授，教授，并历任副院长和院长。他的研究主要关注合同理论，博弈理论，供应链管理和动态规划，中美经济及教育发展与合作等。曾在管理科学领域顶级或一流期刊如Operations Research，Management Science和M&SOM等发表多篇论文, 并担任POMS, IIE Transactions，Decision Sciences等国际一流期刊的副主编或高级编辑，是管理科学领域内国际知名专家。
Abstract:
Consider a buyer who would like to procure certain products for current consumption and the underlying technologies so that he can become a supplier and compete with current suppliers in the future market. One potential procurement mechanism for such a buyer is to bundle the procurement project with technology acquisition. We propose a dynamic stochastic game-theoretic model that analyzes the optimal technology offer strategies of the asymmetric suppliers and highlights how the size of the current project, relative to the size of the future market, and supplier competition determine the effectiveness of the bundled procurementmechanism for the buyer. We find that a project size of 5% to 10% of the future market is sufficient for the suppliers to offer their best technologies. Under such conditions, the premium for the buyer to pay for technology acquisition is relatively small, compared to the pro?t the buyer achieves by becoming a future technology supplier and competing with existing suppliers in the future market.